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A New Logic in the Sufi  Organization: The Continuation and the 
Disintegration of the Tarīqas in Modern Egypt1)
Takahashi Kei*
Abstract
The present article examines the logic behind “succession” to the leadership (mashyakha) 
within the tarīqas, and some factors involved in their disintegration in early 20th 
century Egypt.
Throughout the history, the question of succession to mashyakha has been a 
frequent cause of confl ict among the members of tarīqas, which at times led to their 
divisions.  Until the beginning of the 19th century, however, the word “tarīqa” did not 
necessarily refer to an organization but literally to the “Sufi  Way,” which is a specifi c 
method of devotion.  Actually, each tarīqa consisted of a number of small groups or 
families headed by their own leaders (shaykhs); this implied that a tarīqa did not have 
to be a single unifi ed organization.
Through the institutionalization of the Egyptian tarīqas initiated by the state in the 
19th century, a new logic in the Sufi  organization was introduced, whereby each tarīqa 
had to be an organization headed by a single shaykh.  This logic created a situation 
which encouraged leaders of those subgroups/families within a given tarīqa, who were 
now ranked as deputies (khalīfas), to claim that they were shaykhs of the independent 
tarīqas.
In 1905, this new logic was stipulated in the regulations, which must have aimed at 
the stability and the continuity of the existing tarīqas.  However, this could not stop the 
recurrence of the divisions.  Rather, a number of khalīfas started to claim independence 
from their shaykhs.
By analysing a case of how al-Habībiyya gained independence from al-Rifā‘iyya, 
one factor responsible for the increase in the disintegration of the tarīqas can be pointed 
out: the new logic in the Sufi  organization itself provided grounds for justifying the 
claims of those khalīfas who wanted to be shaykhs of their own tarīqas.  In other 
words, the state’s very endeavor to stabilize the tarīqas served on the contrary to create 
instability.
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1. Introduction
While the issue of “succession” among the Sufi s is generally discussed as a matter of their genealogy 
(silsila), this paper approaches the issue from the point of view of their organizational aspects—
generally recognized as “tarīqa.”
Throughout history, the question of succession to the leadership (mashyakha) has been a 
frequent cause of confl ict among the tarīqas, which at times led to their divisions.  In many instances, 
these confl icts were brought about by some ambitious deputies (khalīfas) who claimed that they were 
not khalīfas but leaders (shaykhs) of their own tarīqas.
In Egypt, under the centralizing policy of Muhammad ‘Alī (who reigned through 1805-48) and 
his successors, which fi nally crystallized into a nation state, the institutionalization of the tarīqas was 
initiated; the Egyptian tarīqas were placed under the supervision of a unitary authority―initially, 
the Shaykh al-Bakrī, and subsequently, the Sufi  Council (majlis al-ṣūfī)—and each group was 
transformed into a more rigid organization [De Jong 1978].  Although it refl ected the rulers’ rather 
simple interest, i.e., control and taxation, the noteworthy aspect of this institutionalization was that 
the rulers were fully aware of the fact that in order to control the tarīqas effectively, they needed to 
be well organized and stabilized in the society.  Consequently, the primary function expected of 
the institution for the tarīqas was to act as a mediator in the confl icts within the tarīqas in order to 
prevent the recurrence of divisions.
However, this could not bring an end to the divisions within the tarīqas; instead, we observe an 
increase in these divisions and an explosion of the emergent tarīqas in the nineteenth century.
From 1895 to 1905, the state intensifi ed its control over the tarīqas by issuing regulations 
(lā’ihāt) stipulating various aspects such as the status of shaykhs and khalīfas, the relationship 
between them, and the conditions for their appointment.  The regulations must have aimed to defi ne 
the tarīqas as more systematized organizations; tarīqas should be “modernized” in order to stabilize 
them within the Egyptian society.  However, these regulations, too, were unsuccessful in bringing an 
end to the recurrence of divisions.  In fact, immediately after these regulations were issued, a number 
of khalīfas requested the government to appoint them as shaykhs of their own tarīqas.
Therefore, the following question arises: Why did the divisions within the tarīqas increase 
despite the state’s endeavor to stabilize the tarīqa organizations?  More specifi cally, how could the 
khalīfa justify his claim of independence when his tarīqa had become a rigid organization in this 
period?
In my opinion, some new factors are involved in the logic of the Sufi  organization that was 
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introduced by the very institutionalization itself.
Based on this hypothesis, I will begin my discussion by examining the manner in which this “new 
logic in the Sufi  organization” was introduced and established within the Egyptian tarīqas; I will then 
proceed to answer the aforementioned question by analyzing the case of tarīqa al-Habībiyya, which 
attained its independence from tarīqa al-Rifā‘iyya in 1925 following a serious confl ict.
2. Tarīqas before 1812
With regard to institutionalization, the evolution of the Sufi  organization in modern Egypt can be 
divided into three phases.  The fi rst phase is the period before 1812, when there were no offi cial 
institutions for the tarīqas in Egypt.  The second phase is from 1812 to 1895, when the institution for 
the tarīqas was introduced in Egypt.  The last phase is from 1895 to the present when institutions for 
the tarīqas were reorganized and incorporated into the state’s administration.
2.1 Tarīqas and “Sufi  Orders”
It is a well-known fact that tarīqas in the Arab world throughout history have not been monolith 
organizations but have comprised small individual groups.  In Ottoman Egypt too, most tarīqas 
consisted of a number of small groups headed by their own shaykhs; this implied that a tarīqa did not 
have to be a single unifi ed organization [Winter 1992: 128-166].
A close analysis of the chronicles and biographies written at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century reveals the more important fact that during these days—and probably, even before then—
these small groups within the tarīqas were not necessarily regarded by their contemporaries as 
branches of their mother tarīqa or as sub-tarīqas.  Indeed, the word “tarīqa” did not represent the 
Sufi  organization at all; rather, literally, it referred to the “Sufi  Way,” which is a specifi c method of 
devotion: rituals (hizb, wird) and genealogy (silsila).
‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Jabartī (1756-1825), a well-known historian of the late Ottoman Egypt, 
counted in his chronicle numerous Ulamas—and several Mamluks and Ottomans—who were 
initiated into tarīqas [Jabartī 1879-1880a: 297-299, 1879-1880b: 2, 59, 147-148].  He himself was 
initiated into al-Khalwatiyya.2)
The descriptions of these intellectual Sufi s almost entirely focused on their good characters 
(ādāb and akhlāq), their learning (‘ilm and ma‘arifa), and their genealogies (isnād and silsila); 
however, apart from the description of their participation in the dhikr sessions, there is scant material 
on their activities as members of the tarīqa or its organizational aspects.  It appears that al-Jabartī 
 2) He was a disciple of Mahmūd al-Kurdī (1715-1781) [Jabartī 1879-1880b: 61-68].
TAKAHASHI: A New Logic in the Sufi  Organization
53
was more interested in the question of who succeeded to the tarīqa than what groups they formed or 
the kind of activities they practiced.
On the other hand, in his references to the collective activities of popular Sufi s, al-Jabartī never 
referred to these groups as “tarīqas.” Here, I would like to quote two passages from his chronology, 
both of which clearly refl ect al-Jabartī’s view on the Sufi  groups.
The fi rst quotation is a description of a saint’s birthday (mawlid), in which Sufi s gathered and 
performed their rituals.
He (a French captain) was affl icted with syphilis, and he made a vow to hold this celebration. 
When he recovered slightly, he began to light some lamps and candles in the mosque and the 
shrine.  Then, he paid the jurists to recite the Qur’ān in the daytime for studying and asked others 
to recite Dalā’il al-Khayyryāt of al-Jāzūlī at night in the mosque.  Then, the situation continued 
to grow in scale and the people of innovations (bida‘)—such as groups (jamā‘a) of al-‘Afīfī, al-
Sammān, al-‘Arabī, and al-‘Īsawiyya—joined to them.  Among them were those who gathered in 
a circle and performed mock recitations of al-Jalāla, and chanters sang qaṣīdas and popular love 
songs.  Among them were those who recited verses from Burda al-Madīh of al-Būṣīrī [Jabartī 
1879-1880c: 39].
Presently, al-‘Afīfi yya, al-‘Arabiyya, and al-‘Īsawiyya are recognized as sub-tarīqas (furū‘) of 
al-Shādhiliyya, and al-Sammānyya as a sub-tarīqa of al-Khalwatiyya.  However, al-Jabartī did not 
regard them as tarīqas at all, and instead, referred to them as “jamā‘a.” As will be mentioned in the 
next chapter, these groups came to be recognized as tarīqas in the nineteenth century.
The second quotation relates the activities of Sufi s in the kiswa procession; in 1810.  When a 
certain ‘Uthmān Agha restored the Zayn al-‘Abidīn shrine, he sent for the Sufi s in order to transport 
the kiswa to cover the tomb inside.
Then, he sent for the people of Satanic tarīqas (ahl al-turuq al-shaytāniyya) known as Sufi  banner 
bearers (al-ashāyir).  They are market men (suqa) and holders of mean occupations (arbāb al-hiraf 
al-mardhul) who attach themselves to the masters of famous shrines such as al-Ahmadiyya, al-
Rif‘āiyya, al-Qādiriyya, al-Burhāmiyya, and so on [Jabartī 1879-1880d: 120].
In the above quotation, while referring to them as the people of Satanic “tarīqas,” al-Jabartī 
never regarded them as members of any established tarīqas such as al-Ahmadiyya, al-Rif‘āiyya, al-
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Qādiriyya, and al-Burhāmiyya, but as rabble who tried to relate themselves to the founders of these 
tarīqas.
Both passages make it evident that al-Jabartī never confl ated the members of the honorable 
tarīqas with the groups of popular Sufi s even if the latter associated themselves with these tarīqas; he 
clearly distinguished the Sufi  Way (tarīqa) from the Sufi  group (jamā‘a).3)
This view was also shared by contemporary Sufi s.  For example, Ahmad al-Sāwī (1761-1825) is 
known as the founder of al-Sāwiyya, which is presently a sub-tarīqa of al-Khalwatiyya.  However, 
the word “tarīqa al-Sạ̄wiyya” cannot be found in his biography written by his direct disciples.  He 
was recognized as one of the many shaykhs of al-Khalwatiyya, and his group was literally known as 
“jamā‘a al-Sạ̄wī ” or “jamā‘a al-ustādh” [Maghribī et al. 1928: 50, 58, 60, 69, 78].4)
2.2 Shaykhs’ Authority
Although “tarīqa” was a name given not to specify the organization but the teaching, it is clear from 
the description of the contemporaries quoted above that Sufi s gathered and formed groups (jamā‘a) 
bearing the names of the specifi c tarīqas.  Indeed, even the intellectual Sufi s formed certain groups, 
or a kind of salon (majlis), where they performed dhikr under their shaykhs [Maghribī et al. 1928: 
34, 37].
These groups, however, could hardly be called “organizations” in the modern sense of the 
word: typically, they consisted of guides (shaykhs/murshids), their direct disciples (murīds), and lay 
members (muhibbs) who for the most part were attracted by the shaykhs’ personality, charisma, 
or blessings.  In most cases, these groups maintained their unity by the face-to-face relationship 
between the shaykhs and the other members; therefore, when the shaykhs passed away, these groups 
would easily dissolve.
Indeed, there were shaykhs in some tarīqas who appeared to represent the tarīqas symbolically; 
in many cases, however, they were the heads of the saint-families rather than the actual leaders of 
Sufi  groups.  The core of al-Ahmadiyya, al-Qādiriyya, al-Rifā‘iyya, and al-Burhāmiyya—generally 
known as the four principle tarīqas in Egypt—were in fact collectives of saint-families, and the 
 3) There were exceptions, of course; it is probable that al-Sa‘diyya and al-‘Īsawiyya were considered as both tarīqa 
and jamā‘a, known to practice peculiar rituals [Jabartī 1879-1880c: 39-40; Jabartī 1879-1880d: 190].
 4) It is probable that the same view was shared even by ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha‘rānī (d. 1565/66), one of the most 
famous Sufi s in medieval Egypt.  According to Michael Winter, al-Sha‘rānī, himself initiated into al-Ahmadiyya, 
blamed other members of the tarīqa.  Winter explains this incoherence as follows; “The explanation for this seem-
ingly paradox lies in Sha‘rānī’s concept of Sufi sm and in the nature of the Ahmadiyya which was not a compact 
tā’ifa, like the Shādhiliyya, but a widespread and rather vague movement which expressed itself on different social 
levels ....  For Sha‘rānī the main thing in any Sufi  relationship did not necessarily mean belonging to a certain order, 
or even practicing a saint cult.” [Winter 1982: 99-101].
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mashyakha of the tarīqas was inherited by the heads of the most important family among them. 
However, these shaykhs’ actual authority over the other members was very limited [De Jong 1978: 
14-19; Winter 1992: 133-138].  In al-Ahmadiyya, for example, which consisted of 13 families (bayt, 
pl. buyut), the heads of the al-Marzuqī family inherited the title of its mashyakha from the beginning 
of the eighteenth century.  However, their authority over the members of al-Ahmadiyya was limited 
to Cairo and the neighboring areas, and the right to supervise the shrine of Ahmad al-Badawī in 
Tantā—the most important shrine in al-Ahmadiyya—was in the hands of the al-Shinnāwī family. 
The authority of the shaykh of al-Qādiriyya, which was inherited by the heads of al-Jīzī family, was 
also very limited.  While there were numerous tekkes inhabited by the members of al-Qādiriyya in 
Egypt, many of them were outside the supervision of this shaykh and run by their own leaders.  As 
for al-Khalwatiyya and al-Shādhiliyya, there were no shaykhs who could represent the tarīqa even 
nominally.  Al-Khalwatiyya was a collective of small groups that comprised individual shaykhs 
and their direct disciples, and there was no supreme authority that could unite these groups.  For 
example, the biography written by the direct disciples of Ahmad al-Sāwī, a Khalwatī shaykh, does 
not reveal any indications of a substantial relationship or fellowship sentiment among the brothers 
(ikhwān) beyond the relationship they had with their master.5)
In sum, the organizational aspects of the tarīqas until the beginning of the nineteenth century—
that is, until the end of the Ottoman society in Egypt—can be understood as follows: in general, 
the tarīqa was not a single, unifi ed organization but a collective of small groups or families.  Each 
group/family, while sharing a common teaching or, more likely, just bearing a common name, stood 
independently under the control of its own shaykh, where there were no organizations or orientations 
to unite them.  It appears that contemporary Sufi s were more interested in the succession and 
manifold of their teaching (tarīqa) than in the continuation of their groups (jamā‘a).
3. Institutionalization of the Tarīqas
3.1 Tarīqas under the Authority of the Shaykh al-Bakrī
In 1812, Muhammad ‘Alī, the governor of Egypt, issued a decree declaring the jurisdiction of the 
shaykh of the al-Bakrī family (Shaykh al-Bakrī), one of the notable Sharifi an families in Egypt, over 
the tarīqas in Egypt.  Shaykh al-Bakrī was authorized to supervise the activities of the tarīqas under 
his jurisdiction and to intervene in their affairs.  By virtue of this decree, an institution for the tarīqas 
was introduced in Egypt for the fi rst time, and the state’s control over Sufi  groups was initiated [De 
 5) Biography of Ahmad al-Sạ̄wī hardly indicates that there existed any substantial relationship between Ahmad 
al-Sạ̄wī and other Khalwatī shaykhs.
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Jong 1978: 20-95].  In 1847, an agreement (ṣakk) was reached between the shaykh al-Bakrī and the 
shaykh al-Azhar, in which it was confi rmed that the affairs related to the tarīqas should be under the 
jurisdiction of the shaykh al-Bakrī and that the shaykh al-Azhar would not interfere in such matters. 
This agreement must have refl ected the ruler’s desire to undermine the resources of al-Azhar, which 
was growing increasingly powerful from the latter half of the eighteenth century.  Since many 
Ulama of al-Azhar were members of the tarīqas, this institution deprived al-Azhar of Sufi  resources. 
However, the actual effectiveness of this agreement was unknown.
Participation in this institution, or more accurately, acceptance of the jurisdiction of the shaykh 
al-Bakrī, was in fact more voluntary than compulsory.  As a consequence, the tarīqas that did not 
benefi t from this institution or those that were active in areas unaffected by the authority of the 
shaykh al-Bakrī remained independent.  Although the institution secured the authority inherited 
among the successive shaykhs within the al-Bakrī family, its actual effectiveness was largely depen-
dent on each shaykh’s abilities.
3.2 A New Logic in the Sufi  Organization
First, I would like to examine the reasons for introducing an institution of this type.  What were its 
benefi ts for the state and the tarīqas? For the state, the institution could serve as a useful tool for the 
control of the populace.
First, this institutionalization can be understood as a part of the state’s centralizing policy.  The 
shaykh al-Bakrī of the time, himself residing in Cairo, placed his agents (wakīl al-mashyakha) all 
over Egypt.  These agents acted as intermediaries between the shaykh and the tarīqas in the regions. 
By placing a supreme authority in the center and keeping its agents in the regions, the state attempted 
to reinforce its control over the populace extending to all corners of its territory.
Additionally, the institutionalization served the purposes of taxation; as some tarīqas contained 
groups of people who were not organized in the guilds, the state could order the shaykhs of these 
tarīqas to collect tax from these groups through the institution.  For example, Muhammad ‘Alī 
assigned Muhammad Yāsīn, who was in the position of the Leader of the Merchants (shāhbandar 
al-tujjār), to the shaykh of al-Rifā‘iyya in order to collect tax from snake charmers, jugglers, and 
acrobats, many of whom were members of al-Rifā‘iyya and were not organized into any guilds [De 
Jong 1978: 37].
In addition, a central authority of this type provided certain benefi ts to the shaykhs of the 
tarīqas.  Nominal as it might have been, mashyakha al-tarīqa was an attractive position that was 
accompanied by a certain authority over its members and a measure of property such as zāwiyas and 
shrines.  Consequently, as I stated at the beginning, the question of the succession to mashyakha has 
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been a frequent cause of confl icts at least among the candidates.  By associating themselves with the 
shaykh al-Bakrī, those shaykhs in position could maintain their authority and their property.  Since 
the shaykh al-Bakrī, along with his rival the shaykh al-Sādāt, had long been an infl uential fi gure 
among the Sufi s and Ulamas in Egypt, frequently acting as a mediator when confl icts arose among 
them, it was natural for him to be chosen as the supreme authority over the Sufi s.  In some ways, this 
central authority functioned to protect the vested interests of those existing shaykhs.
Regardless of the benefi ts that both sides may have enjoyed, the institutionalization brought 
about a drastic change in the form of the tarīqas.
The institution for the tarīqas, by its nature, required supreme authority in each tarīqa.  In 
order to ensure the proper functioning of this institution, each tarīqa was represented by only one 
shaykh—shaykh al-tarīqa—who was not merely a nominal leader but was now responsible for “his” 
tarīqa and was authorized to manage all the affairs therein.  As a result, the autonomy enjoyed by 
each group within the tarīqa until then was considerably restricted.  The leaders of these subgroups, 
who were now ranked as khalīfas of the tarīqa, had to choose from the following options: accepting 
the control of shaykh al-tarīqa, retaining his independence, if possible, outside the jurisdiction of 
shaykh al-tariqa, or leaving the existing tarīqa to establish his own tarīqas.
In fact, we observe an explosion of emergent tarīqas in the nineteenth century.  Many of the 
subgroups that were known as “jamā‘a,” “tā’ifa,” or “bayt”—but never “tarīqa”—began claiming 
that they were independent “tarīqas.” For example, the houses (buyut) of al-Ahmadiyya came to be 
recognized as its sub-tarīqas (furu‘).  As mentioned earlier, al-Afīfi yya and al-Sammāniyya, which 
were known as jamā‘a by al-Jabartī, came to be known as independent tarīqas during this period.
This change in the form of tarīqas can be explained as the introduction of a new logic in the Sufi  
organization; in other words, a tarīqa has to be an organization headed by a single shaykh.  While 
the basis of the organization is its teaching—specifi c rituals and genealogy—the continuity of the 
teaching can be achieved by the continuity of the organization.  Here, we can recognize the present 
and generally accepted understanding that “tarīqa” means “Sufi  Organization” or “Sufi  Order.” Now, 
one tarīqa cannot contain several subgroups and it must be a unifi ed organization; moreover, the 
divisions of the organization were understood as the divisions of the tarīqa itself and vice versa.
This process of the transformation of the tarīqa into an organization can be traced, albeit 
roughly, by paying attention to the changes in the meaning of the word “tarīqa” in contemporary 
sources.
As we have seen, the word “tarīqa” itself did not represent the actual Sufi  groups in the chronicle 
of al-Jabartī.  Indeed, even in the decree issued in 1812, this distinction was observed; while we 
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cannot fi nd the word “tarīqa” in the text at all, the expression “the groups of the Sufi s (tawā’if al-
fuqarā’ al-ṣufi yya)” was used [Bakrī 1905: 377].  In the agreement between the shaykh al-Bakrī  and 
the shaykh al-Azhar, issued in 1847, the expression “shaykhs of the tarīqas (mashāyikh al-turuq)” 
appears [Bakrī 1905: 43]; however, it is diffi cult to ascertain whether or not “turuq” (pl. of tarīqa) 
in this context signifi es the actual Sufi  group.  In ‘Alī Mubārak’s geography published in 1886-88, 
the word “tarīqa (al-tarīqa al-ṣufi yya)” clearly signifi es substantial Sufi  groups [Mubārak 1886-1888: 
129-130].  Moreover, the title of “the supreme shaykh over the shaykhs of the tarīqas (shaykh 
mashāyikh al-turuq al-ṣufi yya),” which was initially held by the shaykh al-Bakrī  and subsequently by 
the chairperson of the Sufi  Council, was said to appear for the fi rst time in the 1880s [De Jong 1978: 
124].  It appears that in the 1880s at the latest, the word “tarīqa” came to signify both “the Sufi  Way” 
and “Sufi  group.”
4. The Making of “Sufi  Orders” in Egypt
4.1 Regulations for the Tarīqas
Eventually, the institution was reborn with the reform initiated from 1895 by Muhammad Tawfīq al-
Bakrī (1870-1932), the shaykh al-Bakrī  of the time.
In 1895, the Regulations for the Tarīqas (lā’iha al-turuq al-ṣufi yya) were issued as a Khedival 
decree.  By virtue of this decree, an administrative body was created in the form of a Sufi  Council 
(majlis al-ṣufī ) consisting of the shaykhs of the major tarīqas and with “the supreme shaykh over the 
shaykhs of the tarīqas” as the chairperson.6)  In 1905, the Internal Regulations for the Tarīqas (al-
lā’iha al-dākhiliyya li’l-turuq al-ṣufi yya) were issued.  These regulations provided guidelines for the 
organization and the activities of the tarīqas; they also elucidated the statuses of the shaykhs and 
khalīfas.
This reform must have had a great impact on the various aspects of the Egyptian tarīqas.  Here, 
we can point out that the new logic in the Sufi  organization was stipulated in these regulations. 
For example, in the second section of the Internal Regulations, the status of the shaykh al-tarīqa is 
stipulated as follows7):
Article 2 One person cannot be appointed as the shaykh of two tarīqas.
Article 3 Each shaykh of a tarīqa is independent of the other.  Every shaykh is associated with 
 6) In principle, the offi ce of “the supreme shaykh over the shaykhs of the tarīqas” was no longer held exclusively by the 
shaykh al-Bakrī  but would be appointed by the Khedive; in fact, the shaykh al-Bakrī held this offi ce until 1946.
 7) My primary reference for these regulations is the text translated in English in [De Jong 1978: 201-214].
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his own tarīqa.  No shaykh is subordinate to another, and there must be only one shaykh in a 
single tarīqa.
Article 11 The chiefs of the branches of the tarīqas in rural districts should not be addressed 
as “shaykhs” of al-tarīqa but exclusively as “nā’ibs.”
The very fact that these regulations were stipulated proves that the new logic was not fully 
established in the Egyptian tarīqas at that time.  However, at present, this logic has become a law 
that must be adhered to by all the tarīqas.
4.2 Sufi  Organization
These regulations were not only provided but thoroughly implemented under the more rationalized 
administration.
The formation of the tarīqa organization had already been initiated in the process of institution-
alization; the basic structure of the organization was arranged in the mid-nineteenth century and has 
not undergone major changes to date [Berger 1970: 68-69; De Jong 1978: 47-50].
A notable feature of the tarīqa organization was the incorporation of two new offi ces—
nā’ib and naqīb—into its structure; until then, members were ranked across four positions—shaykh, 
khalīfa, murīd, and muhibb—according to their spiritual attainment.  Nā’ib and naqīb, chosen from 
among khalīfas, were functions rather than spiritual grades, and they played crucial roles in the 
management of the organization.
Nā’ib was a chief of a branch who, acting as the shaykh’s agent, managed affairs in his branch. 
Beneath the nā’ib, were the naqībs, who handled more subtle matters.8)  Although nā’ibs and naqībs 
were chosen by the shaykh, they had to receive their offi cial appointment by the Sufi  Council.
Shaykhs and nā’ibs were not always on good terms.  For example, a memorandum issued in 
1943 from the Sufi  Council reveals that friction between shaykhs and nā’ibs was increasing, and 
the Council had received a number of petitions from both sides.9)  As will be mentioned in the next 
section, some nā’ibs even claimed independence from their shaykhs.
With regard to the mashyakha, it was stipulated in the internal regulations (sec. 2 art. 6) that 
the eldest son should succeed to the offi ce.  However, the appointment of new shaykhs required 
approval from the Council.
 8) For example, four naqībs were assigned under each nā’ib in Alexandria in 1946.  Cf. Egyptian National Archives, 
Cairo, al-‘Abidīn records (Mahfaza al-‘Abidīn, abbreviated hereafter as MA) 539, 12 August 1946, “List of Nā’ibs 
and Naqībs of the Tarīqas in Alexandria.”
 9) MA539, 24 April 1943, “A Memorandum from the Supreme Shaykh over the Shaykhs of the Tarīqas to Shaykhs of 
Tarīqas.”
Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (1)
60
Although a shaykh was in charge of both spiritual guidance and the management of the 
organization, several shaykhs actually entrusted the management to their deputies (wakīls).  The 
memorandum issued in 1943 pointed out the increase of this practice and stipulated that the appoint-
ment of wakīls was permitted only in exceptional cases such as the shaykh’s illness and only with 
permission from the Council.10)
With regard to the activities of the tarīqas, agents (wakīl al-mashyakha) of the Supreme Shaykh 
over the Shaykhs of the Tarīqas, placed throughout the country, played crucial roles.  Typically, 
these agents were local notables chosen from among the members of tarīqas, sharīfs, or custodians 
of the shrines.11)  As the regulations stipulated conditions for their activities, it was these agents who 
actually directed them.  For example, when the birthday of King Fāruq I was to be celebrated on 
February 11, 1943, the Council notifi ed each agent on the details of arranging the celebration and 
directing the tarīqas on the day.12)
It is concluded here that as a result of the state’s thorough intervention as illustrated above, the 
new logic in the Sufi  organization was fully established in the Egyptian tarīqas, transforming them 
into a single unifi ed organization in mid-twentieth century at the latest.
4.3 A Confl ict over the Independence of al-Habībiyya from al-Rifā‘iyya
Despite the fact that this new logic was stipulated and implemented by the state, which must have 
aimed at the stability and continuity of the tarīqas, the divisions within the tarīqas continued.
In fact, immediately following the issuance of the Internal Regulations in 1905, a number of 
khalīfas appealed to the Sufi  Council, claiming that they should be appointed as the shaykhs of their 
independent tarīqas.13)
In most cases, these khalīfas fi nally attained independence from their previous shaykhs.  How-
ever, this was not always easily achieved.  Serious confl icts frequently occurred between the khalīfas 
and their shaykhs, and the decisions made by the Sufi  Council did not always satisfy both sides.
Here, I would like to analyze a case of one such confl ict—the confl ict over the independence 
of al-Habībiyya from al-Rifā‘iyya.  This confl ict arose when Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hādī al-Habībī, 
the nā’ib of al-Rifā‘iyya, appealed to the Sufi  Council, claiming that he should be appointed as the 
 10) MA539, 24 April 1943, “A Memorandum from the Supreme Shaykh over the Shaykhs of the Tarīqas to Shaykhs of 
Tarīqas.”
 11) On the conditions for the appointment of wakīls see the Internal Regulations for the Tarīqas, section 3, article 1 & 
2 [De Jong 1978: 210-211].
 12) MA539, 7 February 1943, “A Notifi cation from the Supreme Shaykh over the Shaykhs of the Tarīqas to the 
Wakīls.”
 13) For example, the following tarīqas obtained their independence during this period: al-Hāmidiyya from al-
Qāwuqajiyya, al-Mughāziyya from al-Sibā‘iyya, and al-Shahāwiyya from al-Burhāmiyya [De Jong 1978: 175-180].
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shaykh of tarīqa al-Habībiyya.14)
The following is the story of this confl ict.
In 1905, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hādī al-Habībī requested the Sufi  Council to appoint him as 
the shaykh of al-Habībiyya; however, his request was immediately rejected.  In the same year, he 
turned to the National Court of Appeal in Cairo (Mahkama al-Isti’nāf Miṣr al-Ahliyya),15) but his 
claim was dismissed.  However, in 1911, when the chairperson of the Sufi  Council was replaced, the 
independence of al-Habībiyya was accepted.  This time, however, the Ministry of Interior opposed 
this decision and the case was taken to the court again.  Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hādī al-Habībī’s claim 
was not accepted, and he was ordered to continue as the nā’ib of al-Rifā‘iyya.  However, in 1925, the 
Ministry of Interior suddenly accepted his claim and al-Habībiyya fi nally obtained independence. 
This was achieved due to a personal relationship between Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hādī al-Habībī 
and Muhammad Hilmī ‘Īsā, who was appointed as the Minister of Interior in 1924; further, both 
Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hādī al-Habībī and Muhammad Hilmī ‘Īsā belonged to the same political party 
(Hizb al-Ittihād).
This raises the following question: Why did Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hādī al-Habībī want to claim 
his independence from al-Rifā‘iyya and on what basis did he justify this claim?
It is diffi cult to identify his precise reason for claiming independence from al-Rifā‘iyya.  How-
ever, there are some indications that already in the 1880s, al-Habībiyya was virtually recognized as 
an independent tarīqa [Mubārak 1886-1888: 17].  Offi cially, however, it was ranked as a house (bayt) 
of al-Rifā‘iyya, and the head of al-Habībiyya—Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hādī al-Habībī—was given the 
title of nā’ib.16)  Moreover, al-Rifā‘iyya has never permitted the existence of sub-tarīqas till date [Al-
Taṣawwuf al-Islāmī  2001: 49].  I speculate that the head of al-Habībiyya had long been yearning for 
its offi cial independence from al-Rifā‘iyya.
The justifi cation of his claim can be found in his petition to the Court in 1905.
Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hādī al-Habībī claimed that tarīqa al-Habībiyya was an independent tarīqa. 
Its founder was his grandfather, the late Muhammad Ahmad al-Habībī, whose shrine is located on 
al-Sayyida Zaynab street in Cairo.  He was initiated into tarīqa(s) by shaykhs who belonged to al-
 14) For this incident, my primary reference is the trial records in MA539, which comprised 13 documents.  See also [De 
Jong 1983: 187-188].
 15) National Courts were established in 1883 to exclusively treat the cases that involved Egyptians; its codes were 
based on those of the Mixed Courts established in 1875 [Hoyle 1991: 186].
 16) This was proven in fi ve documentary evidences submitted to the courts by the shaykh al-Rifā‘iyya.  Cf. MA539, 21 
Rabī‘ al-Awwal 1300, 1304, 10 Rabī‘ al-Akhar 1305, 19 Rajab 1305, n.d.
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Ahmadiyya, al-Shādhiliyya, al-Khalwatiyya, al-Naqshbandiyya, and al-Rifā‘iyya.  He taught all 
these tarīqas to his disciples until his death.  He (Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hādī al-Habībī) continued 
(his claim) that this tarīqa had its specifi c form of prayers and rituals (ṣalawāt, ahzāb, and awrād). 
Muhammad Ahmad al-Habībī had appointed the late Muhammad al-Habībī, his (the claimant’s) 
father, as the successor of this tarīqa.17)
In sum, his claim was based on the fact that his grandfather, the founder of al-Habībiyya, had 
received several tarīqas other than al-Rifā‘iyya, which Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hādī al-Habībī had taken 
over from his father (Muhammad al-Habībī) and also on the fact that its prayers and rituals were 
different from those of al-Rifā‘iyya.
This claim appears to be reasonable in view of the new logic in the Sufi  organization: The base 
of an organization is its teaching.  Since al-Habībiyya differs from al-Rifā‘iyya in its teachings—
prayers, rituals, and genealogy—it should also differ from al-Rifā‘iyya in its organization.
If this is the case, then why was the claim repeatedly rejected by the authority?
The answer lies in the logic itself.  The grounds on which he claimed independence were com-
monalities shared by all tarīqas in Egypt.  It has been a common practice to initiate one person into 
several tarīqas, and it is not diffi cult to fi nd a prominent shaykh who would have introduced new 
rituals and composed his original prayer manuals in a tarīqa.  Thus, his claim, if accepted, could also 
lead to the division of other tarīqas in Egypt.
In fact, in his report on the incident in 1905, the Supreme Shaykh over the Shaykhs of the 
Tarīqas expressed his fear that if he had accepted the independence of al-Habībiyya, it would have 
served as a precedent for other ambitious khalīfas in justifying their demand for independence, and 
this would have triggered the division of other tarīqas in Egypt.18)  The same fear was shared by the 
Ministry of Interior.  In 1911, when the new chairperson of the Sufi  Council accepted al-Habībiyya’s 
independence, the Ministry was strongly opposed to his decision.
Eventually, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hādī al-Habībī obtained his independence through a personal 
connection with the then Minister of Interior; this implies that the Sufi  Council could not solve the 
problem.
The confl ict over the independence of al-Habībiyya presents an interesting case; his claim, which 
was grounded in the new logic of the Sufi  organization, led to an unfavorable situation for the state. 
Ironically, the new logic in the Sufi  organization, which was introduced and established through 
 17) MA539, 24 February 1906, “The Conclusion of the Trial at the National Courts of Appeal in Cairo.”
 18) MA539, 30 January 1907, “Report from the Supreme Shaykh over the Shaykhs of the Tarīqas to the Palace.”
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the institutionalization initiated by the state, itself served as the grounds for the divisions within the 
tarīqas in the twentieth century.
5. Conclusion
The case of al-Habībiyya was merely one of many such confl icts.  Therefore, I do not believe it is 
possible to specify all the factors responsible for the increase in the divisions within the tarīqas during 
this period.
However, at least one factor can be pointed out: the new logic in the Sufi  organization that was 
introduced in the nineteenth century provided grounds for justifying the claims of those khalīfas who 
wanted to be shaykhs of their own tarīqas.  In other words, the state’s very endeavor to “modernize” 
the tarīqa organization and stabilize it within the Egyptian society served on the contrary to create 
instability.
This irony can be explained in part by reviewing the evolution of the organizational aspect of 
the tarīqa as illustrated in this paper.  Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, as a tarīqa was 
not an organization but a teaching, it could be maintained as long as a single person succeeded to its 
teaching.  However, with the introduction of the new logic in the Sufi  organization by its institution-
alization, a tarīqa no longer could be maintained without its organization; now the continuity of its 
teachings could be achieved only by the continuity of its organization.  At this stage, the weakness 
of the Sufi  organization19) came to be the critical feature that could endanger the stability or, in the 
worst case scenario, very the existence of the tarīqa itself.
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